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1. The issues presented here concern the validity 
of state taxation of (1) cigarette sales by members of certain 
Indian tribes to Indians and non-Indians on the reservation, 
and (2) the personal property of Indians who reside on the 
reservation, including their automobiles. Also drawn into 
question is the power of the United States District Court 
to enjoin the enforcement of the state tax laws in light of 
the general prohibition against such injunctions contained 
in 28 U.S.C. § 1341. 
2. Facts and Opinions Below: The Flathead Indian 
Reservation, created by the Treaty of Hell Gate of 1855, 
12 Stat. 975, consists of approximately 1,245,000 acres, of 
which approximately 628,642 acres are owned in fee, some 
by Indians and some by non-Indians, 628,311 acres are held 
in trust for the Confederated Salish and Kootenai tribes 
or individual Indians, and 1,017 acres are owned by the 
United States. The Reservation is located in Montana. 
Tribal members comprise 19% of the total Reservation popu-
lation. There are farms, ranches, and communities scattered 
throughout the inhabited portions of the Reservation. All 
services provided by the state and local governments are 
equally available to Indians and non-Indians. The state 
operates the only schools on the Reservation. A system of 
streets, county roads, and state highways has also been 
built and is maintained by the state and local governments. 
The federal government makes substantial expenditures for 
~




programs in education, social services~ housing improvement, 
employment assistance, forestry, road construction and main-
tenance, and Indian business development. 
Two separate actions were filed in the USDC (Montana) 
by the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes and various 
members. Each case was heard by the same three-judge dis-
trict court. The first, from which appellees have taken a 
cross-appeal (No. 75-50), involved application of Montana's 
cigarette tax statutes to tribal members on the Reservation 
(hereinafter "Moe"). The second, not involved in the cross-
appeal, concerned the application of Montana's personal 
property tax to tribal members on the Reservation (hereinafter 
"Montana"). , {~) 
In Moe the cross-appellants challenged the constitu-
tional validity of the cigarette tax statutes of the State 
of Montana, R.C.M., 1947, §§ 84-5606-5606.31 and sought a 
permanent injunction against their future application to them. 
One of the plaintiffs below (Wheeler), who is now deceased, 
was a member of the Tribes and had established retail stores 
on two tracts of land within the Reservation held in trust 
by the United States, where he sold cigarettes. For the 
right to sell cigarettes he paid an administrative fee to 
the Tribes. The Tribes are also authorized by their Consti-
tution to tax_figarette sales within the Reservation but ve 
--. -
not done so to date. Wheeler did not possess a state cigarette -
vendor's license, and did not affix the state cigarette tax 
sales stamps or precollect the state cigarette sales tax, as 
4. 
r equired by Montana law. He was arrested for noncompliance 
with the state statutes and a portion of his inventory was 
confi sca t ed. The tax is 12 cents on a package, 4.5 cents 
of which is allocated by state law to the general revenue 
fund which is used f or the support of services to both 
Indians and non-Indians. 
The three-judge court declared the tax statutes in-
valid and permanently enjoined their enforcement to the 
extent that they required members of the Tribes residin~ on 
the Reservation to possess state vendor's licenses and to 
I 
the extent they applied to cigarette sales within the Reser-
vation by tribal members to Indians who resided within the 
~ 
Reservation. The court further .held that~the statutes were 
valid insofar as they required tribal members to precollect 
1 the state cigarette tax imposed on non-Indian purchasers. 
It is this latter portion of the judgment which is the subject 
of the cross-appeal. 
In reaching this holding the court rejected the con-
tention that it lacked the power to issue an injunction be-
cause of the Federal Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341. 
In its first opinion the court found § 1341 inapplicable 
under the federal instrumentality doctrine. Appx. 77-79. 
In its second opinion it recognized that the validity of 
1 Four s arate opinions were issued by the three-judge 
G._OU:J;:t_ in t ese cases, ~rst on c , 
The subsequent opinions build upon the first, and the 
final judgment was filed March 19, 1975. 
·'·· 
5. 
this doctrine as a basis for immunity from state taxation 
with respect to Indians and Indian property was questionable 
after Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 150-55 
(1973), and McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n., 411 U.S. 
164, 169-70 & n.5 (1974). Appx. 43 n.9. It thus reconsidered 
this question and examined the legislative history of § 1341 
and the cases decided thereunder. Appx. 41-47. The court 
concluded from this analysis that § 1341 does not bar federal 
court jurisdiction where "immunity from state taxation is 
asserted on the basis of federal law with respect to persons 
or entities in whieh the United States has a real and sig-
nificant interest." Id. 43. Accordingly it found it un-
necessary to decide whether plaintiff Wheeler's business 
venture was an instrumentality of the United States since 
there was no doubt that the United States has a real and 
significant interest in the Tribes and its members. 
The three-judge court then examined the existing 
jurisdictional relationships between the Tribes and Montana. 
\
Montana had assumed complete criminal and limited civil 
jurisdiction over the Indians residing in the Reservation 
P.L. 280, 67 Stat. 588, August 15, 1953, 
underkhe predecessor statute to 25 U.S.C. §§ _132Z, 1324 
considered by this Court in McClanahan. Even assuming the 
validity of this assumption of jurisdiction under P.L. 280 
the court reasoned that the 
tax laws were civil, not criminal, in nature and that Montana's 
._--.. -----
existing civil jurisdiction over the Reservation 
Indians (~ Appx. 49) did not justify the tax statutes here. 
6. 
It noted that under McClanahan and the prior decisions of 
this Court Indian citizens living on the Reservation are 
still regarded as a separate, semi-independent people, with 
the power of regulating their internal affairs, free from --
state interference. The court thus concluded that consis-
tent with these principles Montana did not have the power 
to impose a tax upon cigarette sales between Tribe members 
on the Reservation or require a Tribe member who sells 
cigarettes on the Reservation to obtain a dealer's license. 
The court reached an oeposite_ conclusion with respect 
to the pre-collection of cigarette excise taxes relating to 
sales to non-Indians. In reaching this conclusion the court 
first cited the state statutory provision which indicated ---that the cigarette taxes were conclusively presumed to be ~ 
a direct sales tax on the retail customer, pre-collected 0 
for the purpose of convenience only. Under this system ~~ 
the seller pays the tax to the wholesaler and adds the cost __/ 
to the purchase price of the cigarettes. The court then 
considered the many decisions of this Court concerning the 
power of the states over Indians, finding none controlling. 
It noted, for example, that this was not a case like Warren 
Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n., 380 U.S. 685 (1965), 
where a licensed trader established a store for the benefit 
of Indians residing on the Reservation. These stores were 
located on U. S. Highway 93 and the court considered it a 
reasonable inference that the stores had not been established 
primarily for the benefit of Indians residing on the Reservation 
•' 
' I·' .. 
1 • 
7. 
but instead were intended to sell cigarettes to prospective 
customers passing on the highway and to residents of neigh-
boring conununities who wished to avoid the sales tax. The 
court concluded that the tax was constitutional since col-
lection of it by the Indian seller would not impose a tax 
burden on the Indian:3 residing on the Reservation or infringe 
in any way tribal self-government. In support of this holding, 
it also cited the si:nilar conclusion reached by the Supreme 
Court of Washington after the remand by this Court in Tonasket 
v. Washington, 411 u.s. 451 (1973), for consideration of 
McClanahan. The Washington Supreme Court had concluded that 
McClanahan did not mandate the conclusion that a state could 
not impose a cigarette excise tax on sales to non-Indians on 
the Reservation. 525 P.2d 744. The three-judge court thus 
rejected the holding of the Supreme Court of Idaho in Mahoney 
v. State of Idaho Tax Comm'n., 524 P.2d 187 (1974), cert. 
denied, u.s. (1974), that the Idaho Tax Commission 
had "no jurisdiction to tax the on-reservation sale of cig-
arettes by an Indian seller whether the purchasers were 
Indians or non-Indians." 
Although agreeing that the court had jurisdiction, the 
Moe dissent said that the majority opinion accomplished a con-
stitutionally suspect discrimination in favor in Indians 
neither mandated by treaty or Act of Congress. The dissent 
disagreed with this Court's construction of the Buck Act in 
McClanahan to the effect that § 109 of the Act evidenced a -------....... ··--
Congressional intent to maintain the tax exempt status of 
8. 
Indians. Appx. 30. It then reasoned that if McClanahan were 
based on implica tion of tax exemption rather than on lack 
of jurisdiction it would have no difficulty distinguishing 
the situation here except with respect to sales on trust 
lands. Unlike the Navajos in McClanahan the Tribes here 
had no tradition of sovereignty until after the Indian Re-
organization Act of 1934 when tribal courts were created 
for the first ti(1'f-/~~~) 
In Montana the appellees sought (1) a judgment de-
"' claring unconstitutional as applied to them Montana statutes 
providing for the a ~;sessment and collection of state personal 
property taxes generally, and in particular,of personal ......._., 
property taxes on motor vehicles, (2) an injunction against 
the statutes' enforcement, and (3) a refund of personal 
property taxes paid to the date of the court's final judgment. 
In its opinion the three-judge court emphasized that the 
appellees did not challenge the state's vehicle registration 
fee which is used for the construction and maintenance of 
roads. They challenged only the motor vehicle property tax 
which is not a designated road tax and is used instead for 
general governmental purposes as are other personal property 
taxes. Relying on its decision in Moe the court held the 
challenged statutes unconstitutional insofar as they required 
the payment of a motor vehicle tax and other personal taxes 
by members of the Tribes residing on the reservations. 
McClanahan again was regarded as controlling. As in Moe the 





final determination of the unconstitutionality of the 
statute. 
The dissent objected to the judgment insofar as it 
declared unconstitutional R.C.M. § 53-114 which conditions 
the issuance of a license on the payment of property and 
license taxes. The dissent reasoned that although the holding 
in Moe mandated that the Reservation be considered a tax-
free sanctuary, thi:3 should not prevent the state from re-
quiring Indians to pay for the right to drive on off-reser-
vation highways and the right to the protection afforded by 
the off-reservation machinery of the Registrar of Motor 
Vehicles. 
3. Contentions: The appellants' (No. 74-1656) first 
contention is that the immunity from state taxation granted 
to the Indians of the Flathead Reservation is a racial dis-
crimination in favor of Indians and against non-Indian 
citizens repugnant to fundamental principles of equal pro-
tection and due process. Appellants cite a host of due 
process and equal protection cases, ~' Loving v. Virginia, 
388 U.S. 1 (1967); Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 
(1954), in support of the proposition that the three-judge 
court decision forces Montana to engage in invidious 
discrimination based on race. 
Appellants' second contention is that the immunity 
from taxation afforded the Flathead Reservation Indians is 
contrary to section 349 of the General Allotment Act, 25 u.s.c. 
§ 349, and related legislation. Appellants cite the language 
\ ' 
10. 
of section 349 which provides that at 'the termination of the 
trust per iod provided for in the Act the land was to be con-
veyed to the Indian in fee and the allottee "shall have the 
benefit of and be. subject to the laws, both civil and criminal 
of the state or territory" in which he resided. Appellants 
recognize that the General Allotment Act became "inoperative" 
after the Indian Reorganization Act of ~934, 48 Stat. 984, 
but contend that it has not specifically been repudiated and 
is consistent with other federal legislation against 
discrimination. 
Appellants' third contention is that the three-judge 
court relied on the federal instrumentality doctrine to 
establish jurisdiction here in the face of the § 1341 pro-
hibition and that this is contrary to Mescalero and McClanahan. 
' 
Appellants also contend that since jurisdiction over the 
action of the individual tribal members was upheld under 
28 U.S.C. § 1343, this decision is in conflict with American 
Commuters Assoc., Inc. v. Levitt, 405 F.2d 1148 (2d Cir. 1969), 
and Bland v. McRann, 463 F.2d 21 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 
410 U.S. 966 (1973), holding that allegations of deprivations 
of civil rights involved in collection of taxes do not permit 
an exception to the § 1341 prohibition. 
In response appellees (No. 74-1656) in part cite the 
Treaty of Hell Gate which reserved for the "exclusive use and 
benefit" of the Salish and Kootenai Tribes the land encompassed 
by the Flathead Reservation and also the Montana Enabling Act 
of February 22, 1889, 25 Stat. 676, 677, which required the 
'·, 
\. .. · 
11. 
state to disclaim all right and title 'to the Indian lands 
within its borders. They argue that there is no significant 
difference between the Flathead Reservation and the Navajo 
Reservation in McClanahan. Since there is no distinction 
between the taxes here and the income tax in McClanahan, the 
outcomes must be th<2 same. 
The cross-appellants (No. 75-50) contend that although 
the three-judge court correctly recognized that the Williams 
v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959), test-- state laws are in-
valid when they reach the point of interfering with tribal 
self-government is applicable here, they misapplied it. 
The pre-collection of taxes with respect to sales to non-
Indians interferes with ·~ibal self-government since the 
Tribes are inhibited from exercising their tribal consti-
tutional authority to impose a tax on the merchandise be-
cause the tribal retailers would then be placed at a com-
petitive disadvantage. The Tribes are precluded from this 
source of revenue. Moreover, the three-judge court's decision 
is contrary to Warren Trading Post. Finally, cross-appellants 
contend that here, as in McClanahan, Montana has not assumed 
general jurisdiction over tribal members on the Reservation 
and there is no way the state can enforce the tax laws in 
question. Jurisdiction is the power to compel and the state 
lacks that power here. See 411 U.S. at 178-79. 
Cross-appellees argue that the retail outlets were 
operated by individual Indians, not the Tribes. Cross-appellants 
are not comparable to the licensed traders in Warren Trading 
12. 
Post. The tax is not upon the Indian seller, but the ulti-
mate purchaser. There is in fact no requirement that the 
Indian seller prepay the tax to the wholesaler when he pur-
chases cigarettes for resale. Sales to non-Indians without 
collection of the tax invites violation of criminal law by 
the non-Indian purchaser. R.S.M. § 84-5608.18 (1947). No 
decision of this Court suggests that such a result would 
find judicial acceptance. 
4. Discussion: Despite the demise of the federal 
instrumentality doctrine as a reason for insulating Indian 
affairs from state tax laws, ~Mescalero Apache Tribe v. 
Jones, supra, at 150 and cases cited therein, an exception 
to the § 1341 prohibition for actions brought by Indians 
appears reasonable in light of the special federal interest 
in their affairs. The three-judge court indicated that the 
legislative history of § 1341 demonstrated that it was in-
tended to eliminate the disparity between the rights afforded 
citizens of a state, and nonresidents and foreign corpora-
tions who because of diversity jurisdiction were able to 
obtain injunctions in federal courts. This purpose would 
not be affected by the result here. The test of a "real and 
significant" federal interest in the particular group affected 
is perhaps too broad, however, since such an exception might 
arguably apply to any class of persons which the Congress has 
protected by statute. But see Bland v. McRann, supra at 24-25 
(allegations of deprivations of civil rights involved in tax 
collections does not provide an exception to§ 1341 prohibition). 
13. 
Ass wning that the three-judge c'ourt had jurisdiction 
then insofar as it held the Montana tax statutes unconsti-
tutionalJ the result appears correct under Warren Trading 
Post, McClanahan, Williams, and the other decisions of this 
Court in this area. Bu~ despite the fact (1) the cigarette 
tax was upon the final purchaser, not the Indian seller, 
(2) the stores were located so as to attract non-Indian 
business, and (3) the cigarettes are in no way connected 
with reservation production or manufacture, the holding that 
the cigarette excise tax with respect to sales on the Flat- 7 
h d R . I d' . . . 1 . ~ 
1 
ea eservatlon to non- n lans lS constltutlona lS ques-
tionable. This is particularly so because the cross-appellants 
assert that the state has not validly asswned general juris-
diction over the tribal members on the Reservation and con-
~~~ 
sequently, as in McClanahan, it does notAhave the juris-
diction necessary to enforce the tax. The three-judge court 
did not deal with this question. In its anlaysis of the 
tax or; cigarette 
validity of the sales to Indians on the Flathead Reservation 
/\ 
it asswned, arguendo, that the state had validly asswned com-
plete criminal and limited civil jurisdiction over the Indians 
residing there. It then concluded that, even though subject 
to being enforced by criminal statutes, the taxing statutes 
were civil in nature, and that the prior limited asswnption 
of civil jurisdiction did not support the taxing statutes here. 
The appellees in both the main appeal and the cross-appeal 
have filed motions to affinn. 
August 12, 1975 Palm Ops in Appx to Appel-
lants (No. 74-1656) 
Jur. Statement 
I • 
C~u~c..1:. 9 ... 'Cl<=t·1S 
Court USDC, D. Mont. Voted on .. ~ ............... , 19 .. . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19... No. 75-50 
Submitted ................ , 19 . . . Announced ................ , 19 ... (Vide 74-1656) 
THE CONFEDERATED SALISH AND KOOTENAI TRIBES OF THE FLATHEAD 
RESERVATION, ET AL., Appellants 
7/9/75 Appeal filed. 
HOLD 
FOR 
Rehnquist, J ...... . .......... . 
Powell, J . ... . .. .. ........ . .. . 
Blackmun, J ................. . 
Marshall, J .................. . 
White, J ....... . ..... . ....... . 
Stewart, J ................... . 
Brennan, J ................... . 
Douglas, J .................... . 
Burger, Ch. J ................ . 
vs. 
JOHN C. MOE, ETC., ET AL. 
CERT. JURISDICTIONAL MERITS MOTION AB- NOT 
1-----r--f----rST_A_T_E,...M_E_N...,T_-+---..-+----,----lsENT VOT-
G D N POST DIS AFF REV AFF G D lNG 
..... ~ .................. .. 
.. .. ·I. .... · .. c .. "IL..\: .. .. 
.. ... ~ . .. ~~ . ~ .~~ ~. f.~.......,.  -
:::: ::t :::: :":~::~ : ::::: 
::::::; :::::::: <:·::.::· 
. .... "1 . ................... . 
. ................ V.. ....... . 
.. 
.- USDC, D .~ont. 
~«1..n.~c.~ 9- ";;2~-1S 
Court Voted on ... , .............. , 19 .. . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 19 . . . 
Submitted ................ , 19 . . . Announced ................ , 19 .. . 




THE CONFEDERATED SALISH AND KOOTENAI TRIBES OF THE FLATHEAD 
RESERVATION, ET AL. 
6/30/75 Appeal filed. 
HOLD CERT. JURISDICTIONAL MERITS MOTION AB- NOT 
FOR 1----..--1---rS_TA_T_E,.M_E_N_T.-----+---r--+---r---tSENT VOT-
G D lNG G D N POST DIS AFF REV AFF 
Rehnquist, J ... . ............. . ·.·.·.··.·.·.·.·.·;: ·.·.·.· .. ·.·.: :::::::::::: ···7. ............ . 
:::::.:: ::::~~ :::~ :::::: 
. .... -/.. ........ ·/ ········ 
• ••• 0. 0 0 0 •• 
Powall, J .................... . 
Blackmun, J ................. . 
Marshall, J .................. . 
White, J ..................... . 
Stewart, J ................... . 
Brennan, J ................... . 
·····:;· ....... . 
• ••••••••••••••••••• 0. 0 ••••• 
Douglas, J ...... .............. . 
Burger, Ch. J ................ . 
.... .. 1 . ........ ·/ ········ 
. ........ ~ ............... . 
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AND KOOTENAI TRIBES 
No. 75-~ 
CONFEDERATEDSALffiH 
AND KOOTENAI TRIBES 
v. 
MOE 
Joint Motion to Dispense 
with Printing Appendix 
G 
and to Proceed on Original 
Record 
On October 6, the Court consolidated and noted probable jurisdiction in 
these appeals from a 3-J USDC (Montana) decision involving state taxation of 
cigarette sales made on a reservation and of personal property of Indians who 
reside on the reservation. 
( 
- 2 ·-
Both sets of parties now move, pursuant . to Rule 36(8), for leave to 
disp ense with the req uirement of an appendix and to permit the cases to be 
heard on the original record. T he parties urge that the only matter relevant 
( for printing in an appendix- -opinions, memoranda and judgments--have already 
\ been printed in the Jurisdictional Shtements. Counsel also advise that in light 
of the Court1 s action noting probable jurisdiction they under stand that they need 
not further address any issue as to the Court1 s jurisdiction and.1 accordingly, 
that no pleadings filed below concerning jurisdiction or the convening of a 3-J 
Court would be relevant so as to merit printing in the appendix. 
DISCUSSION: It is not clear what counsel intend by their last statement. 
However 1 for purposes of the motion.1 it does not appear that any pleadings filed 
below would bear on the 28 U.S. C. 1341 (Tax Injunction Act) jurisdictional que s-
tion. In any event, the pleadings would be available in the record. 
The Court has been liberal in granting motions to dispense with an 
appendix on the gr~mnds given by the parties. 
There is no response. 
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No. 75-50 
CONFEDERATEDSALlliH 
AND KOOTENAI TRIBES 
v. 
MOE 
See Memorandum in Noo 74-1656. 
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Brennan, J ................... . 
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Burger, Ch. J ................ . 
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Moe v. Salish & Kootenai 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAT~ 
Nos. 74-1656 AND 7ih'i0 .  
i.-.1 f. John C. Moe, etc., et al., 
Appellants, 
74-1656 v, 
r,I'he Confederated Salish 
and Kootenai Tribes of 
the Flathead Reserva-
tion et al. 
The Confederated Salish 
and Kootenai Tribes of 
the Flathead Reserva-
tion et al., Appellants, 
75- 50 v. 
John C. Moe, etc., et al. 
On Appeals from the United 
States District Court for 
the District of Montana, 
[April -, 1976] 
MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
We are called upon in these appeals to resolve several 
questions arising out of a conflict between the asserted 
taxing power of the State of Montana and the immunity 
claimed by the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes 
(Tribe) and its members living on the tribal reservation. 
Convened as a three-judge court/ the District Court for 
the District of Montana considered separate attacks on 
the State's cigarette sales and personal property taxes as 
applied to reservation Indians. After finding that the 
suits were not barred by the prohibition of 28 U. S. C. 
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§ 1341/ the District Court entered final judgments which, 
with one exception, sustained the Tribe's challenges, and 
from which the State has appealed (No. 74-1656). The 
Tribe has cross-appealed from that part of the judgment 
upholding tax jurisdiction over on-reservation sales of 
cigarettes by members of the Tribe to non-Indians. We 
noted probable jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1253 and 
consolidated the appeal and cross-appeal.3 -U.S.--. 
(1976). Concluding that the District Court had the 
power to grant injunctive relief in favor of the Tribe, and 
that it was correct on the merits, we affirm in both cases, 
~ I 
In 1855 an expfnse of land stretching across the Bitter 
Root River Valley and within the then Territory of 
Washington was reserved for "the use and occupation" 
of the "confederated tribes of the Flathead, Kootenay, 
and Upper Pend d'Oreilles Indians," by the Treaty of 
Hell Gate, which in 1859 was ratified by the Senate and 
proclaimed by President Buchanan. 12 Stat. 975. 
Slightly over half of its 1.25 million acres is now owned 
in fee, by both Indians and non-Indians; most of the 
remaining half is held in trust by the United States for 
the Tribe. Approximately 50% of the Tribe's current 
membership of 5,749 reside on the reservation and in 
turn comprise 19% of the total reservation population. 
Embracing portions of four Montana counties-Lake, 
Sanders, Missoula, and Flathead-the present reserva-
tion was generally described by the District Court: 
"The Flathead Reservation is a well-developed 
2 See Part II, infra, for the discussion of the jurisdictional 
' question. 
3 For ease of reference, the various parties involved in the appeal 
and cross-appeal will be referred to simply as the State and the: 
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agricultural area with farms, ranches and communi-
ties scattered throughout the inhabited portions of 
the Reservation. While some towns have predom-
inantly Indian sectors, generally Indians and non-
Indians live together in integrated communities. 
Banks, businesses and professions on the Reserva-
tion provide services to Indians and non-Indians 
alike. 
"As Montana citizens, members of the Tribe are 
eligible to vote and do vote in city, county and state 
elections. Some hold elective and appointed state 
and local offices. All services provided by the state 
and local governments are equally available to In-
dians and non-Indians. The only schools on the 
Reservation are those operated by school districts 
of the State of Montana. The State and local gov-
ernments have built and maintain a system of state 
highways, county roads and streets on the Reserva-
tion which are used by Indians and non-Indians 
without restriction." 392 F . Supp. 1297, 1313' 
(Mont. 1975) . 
Joseph Wheeler, a member of the Tribe, leased from it 
two tracts of trust land within the reservation whereon 
he operated retail "smoke shops." Deputy sheriffs ar-
rested Wheeler and an Indian employee for failure to· 
possess a cigarette retailer's license and for selling non-· 
tax-stamped cigarettes, both misdemeanors under Mon-
tana law. These individuals, joined by the Tribe and 
the tribal chairmen, then sued 4 in the District Court 
for declaratory and injunctive relief against the State's 
cigarette tax and· vendor licensing statutes as applied to· 
4 The defendants-appellants in the cigarette tax case are Mon-
tana 's Department of Revenue, its director, and the sheriffs of the 
counties m which the "smoke shops" were located No monetary 
relief has been sought in this action. 
'. 
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tribal members who sold cigarettes within the reserva-
tion.6 That court by a divided vote held that our de-
cision in McClanahan v. Arizona State 'Tax Comm'n, 411 
U. S. 164 (1973), barred Montana's efforts to impose its 
cigarette tax statutes on the Tribe's retail cigarette sales 
with one exception: it may require a precollection of the 
tax imposed ·by law upon the non-Indian purchaser of 
the cigarettes.6 
In a later action, the Tribe and four enrolled members, 
all residents of the reservation, challenged 7 Montana's 
~ Suit was brought shortly after the arrests. The record does not 
indicate whether criminal proceedings were instituted in state court, 
and in any case the State has made no claim as to the propriety of 
the District Court's entry of relief under Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 
:37 ( 1971), and related decisions from this Court. 
6 The District Court noted that the State's present statutory 
scheme contemplates advance payment or "precollection" of the 
sales tax by the retailer when he purchases his inventory from the 
wholesaler. Recognizing that its holding-a distinction between 
sales to Indians and to non-Indians-would result in "complicated 
problems" of enforcement by the State, the District Court deferred 
passing on these problems pending a decision by this Court. We of 
course express no opinion on this question. 
7 Named as defendants were various county officials, the State's 
Department of Revenue and its director, and the State itself. In 
contrast to the cigarette tax case, however, the plaintiffs, suing as 
representatives of all other members of the Tribe residing on the 
reservation, demanded a refund of personal property taxes paid to 
the date of the District Court's final judgment. In the opinion ac-
companying the District Court's judgment entering the requested 
declaratory and injunctive relief in favor of the Tribe and the 
individual Indians, it stated that "any further questions" were re-
served pending this Court's final determination of the constitutiOn-
ality of the personal property tax statutes. The questions, then, of 
whether and to what extent the District Court would have subject-
matter jurisdiction over claims for refunds, at the behest of the 
Tribe or its members, are not before us, and we leave them for the 
trial court to determine in the first instance. For example, any ac-
ti!)n b~sed. Qn 28 U. S C. ~ 1331 must comply with 1ts $10,000 lnnita-
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statutory scheme for assessment and collection of per-
sonal property taxes, in particular the imposition of such 
taxes on motor vehicles owned by tribal members resid-
ing on the reservation.8 The District Court, again by a 
divided vote, found its earlier decision interpreting Mc-
Clanahan controlling in the Tribe's favor. While recog-
nizing, as did the Tribe, that a fee required for registra-
tion and issuance of state license plates for a motor 
vehicle could be exacted from Indians residing on the 
reservation,9 the Court held that the additional personal 
property tax which was likewise made a condition prece-
dent for lawful registration of the vehicle could not be 
imposed on reservation Indians. 
II 
The important threshold question in both cases is 
whether the District Court was prohibited from entering 
juri.sdiction over these suits to restrain Montana's taxing 
authority, inasmuch as Congress has provided that 
"[t]he district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or 
tion, with the corollary rule that "multiple plaintiffs with separate 
and distinct claims must each satisfy the jurisdictional-amount re-
quirement for suit in the federal courts." Zahn v. International 
Paper Co., 414 U. S. 291, 294 (1973) . The present record, under-
standably, does not reflect the dollar amount involved. 
8 The Tribe and the individual members had earlier filed an identi-
cal attack against Montana's personal income tax as applied to in-
come earned by tribal members on the reservation. Shortly after 
this Court's decision in McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, supra, 
the State stipulated that McClanahan barred its taxing jurisdiction 
in this respect and agreed to cease voluntarily its collection efforts 
and make refunds. Relying on this settlement, the Tribe thereafter 
requested the State's attorney general to order a similar cessation 
with respect to personal property taxes. Advised that its request 
was rejected, the Tribe instituted this action. 
9 The tribe has from the beginning expressly disclaimed any im-
munity from this nondiscriminatory vehicle registration fee. 
.• 
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restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any 
tax under State law where a plain, speedy and effi., 
cient remedy may be had in the courts of such 
State." 28 U. S. C. § 1341. 
;By enacting this jurisdictional rule, Congress gave e~­
plicit sanction to the pre-existing federal equity practice : 
pecause interference with a "State's in,_ternal economy is 
inseparable from a federal action to restrain state 
taxation, 
"'the mere illegality or unconstitutionality of a 
state .. . tax is not in itself a ground for equitable 
relief in the courts of the United States. If the 
remedy at law is plain, adequate, and complete, the 
aggrieved party is left to that remedy in the state 
courts, from which the cause may be brought to this 
Court for review if any federal question is involved.' 
Matthews v. Rodgers, [284 U. S. 521, 525-526 
(1932)]." 'Great Lakes Co. v. Huffman, 319 U. S. 
293, 298 (1943). 
This broad jurisdictional barrier, however, has been 
held by this Court to be inapplicable to suits brought by 
the United States "to protect itself and its instrumen-
... talities from unconstitutional state extactions." Depart .. 
ment of Employment v. United States, 385 U. S. 355, 358 
l (1966).10 
The District Court, citing Department of Employment 
·and cases from other courts, concluded that 
" [w]hile the exceptions to § 1341 have been ex-
pressed most often in terms of the Federal instru-
mentality doctrine, we do not view the exceptions: 
10 There the United' States sought injunctive relief against certain 
state taxation of its coplaintiff, the American National Red Cross, 
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as limited to cases where the doctrine is clearly ap-
plicable. It seems clear [that § 1341] does not bar 
federal court jurisdiction in cases where immunity 
from state taxation is asserted on the basis of federal 
law with respect to persons or entities in which the 
United States has a real and significant interest." 
392 F. Supp., at 1303 (emphasis added) . 
In its brief Montana argues that any r:eliance on the 
federal instrumentality doctrine, either as such or as 
expanded by the District Court, for purposes of finding 
jurisdiction in these cases is contrary to the substantive 
decisions from this Court which "cut to the bone the 
proposition that restricted Indian lands and the proceeds 
from them were-as a matter of constitutional law-
automatically exempt from state taxation." Mescalero 
Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U. S. 145, 150 (1973). See 
McClanahan, supra, at 170 n. 5; Oklahoma Tax Comm'n 
v. Texas Co., 336 U. S. 342 (1949); Oklahoma Tax 
Comm'n v. United States, 319 U. S. 598 (1943) . 
We have indeed recently declined "the invitation to 
resurrect the expansion version of the intergovernmental-
immunity doctrine that has been so consistently rejected" 
in this kind of case. Mescalero, supra, at 155. While 
the concept of a federal instrumentality may well have 
greater usefulness in determining the applicability of 
§ 1341, Department of Employment v. United States,. 
supra, than in providing the touchstone for deciding· 
whether or not Indian tribes may be taxed, Mescalero, . 
supra, we do not believe that the District Court's ex-
panded version of this doctrine, quoted above, can by· 
itself avoid the bar of § 1341. 
The District Court, however, also relied on a more 
recent Jurisdictional statute, 28 U. S. C. § 1362, whicru 
prov1des: 
1'The district courts shall have original lurisdict.iotl! 
•. 
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of all civil actions, brought by any Indian tribe or 
band with a governing body duly recognized by the 
Secretary of the Interior, wherein the matter in con-
troversy arises under the . Constitution, laws, or 
treaties of the United States." Oct. 10, 1966, Pub. 
L. 89-635, § 1, 80 Stat. 880. 
Sections 1341 and 1362 do not cross-reference each 
other. Since presumably all actions properly within the 
jurisdiction of the United States District Courts are au-
thorized by one or another of the statutes conferring 
jurisdiction upon those courts, the mere fact that a ·juris-
dictional statute such as § 1362 speaks in general terms 
of "all" enumerated civil actions docs not itself signify 
that Indian tribes are exempted from the provisions of 
§ 1341.11 
Looking to the legislative history of § 1362 for what-
ever light it may shed on the question, we find an indi-
cation of a congressional purpose to open the federa1 
courts to the kind of claims that could have been brought 
by the United States as trustee, but for whatever reason 
were not so brought. Section 1362 is characterized by 
the reporting House Judiciary Committee as providing 
"the means whereby the tribes are assured of the same 
judicial determination whether the action is brought in 
their behalf by the Government or by their own attor-
neys." 12 While this is hardly an unequivocal statement 
of intent to allow such litigation to proceed irrespective 
of other explicit jurisdictional limitations, such as § 1341, 
it would appear that Congress contemplated that a tribe's 
access to federal court to litigate a matter arising "under 
11 Section 1341 itself, of course, includes a proviso that the remedy 
in state court must be "plain, speedy and efficient." The Tribe does 
not cla1m that it would not have had such a remedy under Montana 
Jaw 
12 H. R Rep No. 2040, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 2-3 (1966). 
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the Constitution, laws, and treaties" would be at least \n 
some respects as broad as that of the United States suing 
as the tribe's trustee. 
That the United States could have brought these 
actwns, by itself or as coplaintiff, seems reasonably clear. 
In Heckman v. United States, 224 U. S. 413 (1912), the 
United States sued to cancel numerous conveyances by 
Cherokee allotees-grantors, who were not parties, as vio-
lative of federal restrictions upon the Indians' power of 
alienation. In the course of concluding that the United 
States had the requisite interest in enforcing these re-
strictions for the Indians' benefit, the Court discussed 
United States v. Rickert, 188 U. S. 432 (1903), which 
upheld the right of the Government to seek injunctive 
relief against county taxation directed at improvements 
on and tools used to cultivate land allotted to and occu-
pied by the Sioux Indians. Of Rickert, the Court in 
ll eckman stated: 
"But the decision [that the United States had the 
requisite interest] rested upon a broader foundation 
than the mere holding of a legal title to land in 
trust, and embraced the recognition of the interest 
of the United States in securing immunity to the 
Indians from taxation conflicting with the measures·. 
it had adopted for their protection." I d., 224 U. S.,. 
at 441 . 
Here the United States could have made the same· 
attack on Montana's assertion of taxing power as was in. 
fact made by the Tribe, Heckman v. United States, 
supra. 13 We think the legislative history of § 1362, 
13 Heckman and Rickert were both cases in which the protection 
asserted by the United States on behalf of the Indians was grounded 
in the federal instrumentality doctrine. Since Mescalero, as we· 
have noted, effectively eliminated that doctrine as a basis for im-
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though by no means dispositive, suggests that in certain 
respects tribes suing under this section were to be ac-
corded treatment similar to that of the United States 
had it sued on their behalf. Since th,e United States is 
not barred by § 1341 from seeking to enjoin the enforce-
ment of a state tax law, Department of Employment v. 
United States, supra, we h~ld that the· 'Tribe is not 
barred from doing so in this case.14 
certain inconsistency in our reliance on Heckman. But the question 
· of whether the United St_ates has standing (Heckman used the 
term "capacity") to sue on behalf of others is analytically distinct 
from the question of whether the substantive theory on which .. it 
relies will prevail, and each is in turn separate from whether · in-
junctive relief can issue at the United States' behest irrespective of 
§ 1341. Depa-rtment of Employment, see text and n. 10, supra, 'did 
not hold that the United States had standing only in actions falling 
within the federal instrumentality doctrine. Cases in the lower 
federal courts cited therein (385 U. S., at 358 n. 6), e. g., Unitei! 
States v. Arlington County, Commonwealth of Virginia, 326 F. 2d 
929, 931-933 (CA4 1964), and other cases from this Court, see In 
re Debs, 158 U. S. 56( 584 (1895); United States v. San Jacinto 
Tin Co., 125 U. S. 273, 284-286 (1888), indicate otherwise. The 
proper basis for the protection asserted here, of course, is not the· 
federal instrumentality doctrine eschewed in ·Mescalero, but is that 
which McClanahan identified, i. e., that state taxing jurisdiction has 
been pre-empted by the applicable treaties and federal legislation. 
While not d'eciding what limits there are upon the Uriited States•· 
standmg to sue absent enabling legislation, we conclude that the 
relationship between the United States and the Tribe-grounded in 
the Hell Gate Treaty an·d a century of subsequent legislation-
would have established the former's standing to raise the pre~emp­
tion claim on behalf of the latter, and that an injuhctive remedy 
to enforce that claim would not have been barred by § 1341. 
14 The District Court went on to find jurisdiction over the indi· 
vidual Indian plamtiffs in 'both actions on the basis of 28 U. S. C. 
§ 1343 (3), together with their allegation that these taxes deprived 
them of a right secured by the Commerce Clause. Noting that 
§ 1362 by its terms goes only to an "Indian tribe or band," the 
State has argued that to hold § 1341 inapplicable merely because· 
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III 
In McClanahan this Court considered the question 
whether the State had the power to tax a reservation 
Indian, a Navajo, for income earned exclusively on the 
reservation. We there looked to the language of the 
Navajo treaty and the applicable federal statutes "which 
define the limits of state power." I d., at 172. Reading 
them against the "backdrop" of the Indian sovereignty 
doctrine, the Court concluded "that Arizona ha[d] ex .. 
ceeded its lawful authority" by imposing the tax at issue. 
ld., at 173. In Mescalero, the companion case, the im .. 
port of McClanahan was summarized: 
"[I]n the special area of state taxation, absent ces-
sion of jurisdiction or other federal statutes permit-
ting it, there has been no satisfactory authority for 
taxing Indian reservation lands or Indian income 
from activities carried on within the boundaries of 
the reservation, and McClanahan v. Arizona Tax 
Comm'n, supra, lays to rest any do~bt in this respect 
by holding that such taxation is not permissible 
absent congressional consent." 411 U. S., at 148. 
Aligning itself with the dissenting opinion below, the 
State first seeks to avoid McClanahan on two grounds: 
(1) the manner in which the Flathead Reservation has 
of force and is contrary to other federal court decisions: Bland v. 
McRann, 463 F. 2d 21 (CA5 1972), cert. denied, 410 U. S. 966 
(1973); American Commuters Assn., Inc . v. Levitt, 405 F. 2d 1148 
(CA2 1969). Cf. Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U. S. 538, 
542 n. 6 (1972) The Tribe's brief does not discuss this aspect of the 
District Court's holding. We need not decide this question, how-
ever, since all of the substantive issues raised on appeal can be 
reached by deciding the claims of the Tribe alone, which did bring 
this action in the District C<Jurt under § 1362. Cf. California Bank-
ers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 D. S. 21 (1974). Any further proceeding~J 
with respect to refund claims by individual Indians, see n. 1, supra., 
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developed to its present state distinguishes it from the 
Navajo Reservation; (2) there does exist a federal statu-
tory basis permitting Montana to tax. 
The State pointed below to a variety of factors: reser-
vation Indians benefitted from expenditures of state reve-
nues for education, welfare, and other services, such as a 
sewer system; the Indians had the right to vote and to 
hold local and state office; and the Iridian and non-Indian 
residents within the reservation were substantially inte-
grated as a business and social community. The District 
Court also found, however, that the Federal Government 
"likewise made substantial payments for various pur-
poses," and that the Tribe's own income contributed 
significantly to its economic well-being. 392 F. Supp., at 
1314. Noting this Court's rejection of a substantially 
identical argument in McClanahan, see 411 U.S., at 173 
& n. 12, and the fact that the Tribe, like the Navajo, 
had not abandoned its tribal organization, the District 
Court could not accept the State's proposition that the 
tribal members "are now so completely integrated with 
the non-Indians ... that there is no longer any reason 
to accord them different treatment than other citizens." 
392 F. Supp., at 1315. In view of the District Court's 
findings, we agree that there is no basis for distinguishing 
McClanahan on this ground. 
As to the second ground, we note that the State does 
not challenge the District Court's overall conclusion that 
the treaty and statutes upon which the Tribe relies in 
asserting the lack of state taxing authority "are essen-
tia]ly the same as those involved in McClanahan." •s 
16 The quote is taken from the first (unpublished) opinion of the· 
District Court, the conclusions of which with respect to McClanahan 
were reaffirmed m the later opm10ns filed May 10, 1974, Feb. 4,. 
1975, and Mar. 19, 1975, published at 392 F. Supp. 1297 & 1325 .. 
ClVll No 2145 (Mont., filed Oct. 10, 1973), reproduced in the: 
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We agree, and it would serve no purpose to retrace our 
analysis in this respect in McClanahan, 411 U.S., at 173-
179. The State instead argues that the District Court 
failed to properly consider the effect of the General Al-
lotment Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 388, and a later enactment 
in 1904, 33 Stat. 302, applying that Act to the Flathead 
Reservation. Section 6 of the General Allotment Act, 24 
Stat. 390, as amended, 25 U. S. C. § 349, provides in part : 
" At the expiration of the trust period and when 
the lands have been conveyed to the Indians by 
patent in fee . .. then each and every allottee shall 
have the benefit of and be subject to the laws, both 
civil and criminal, of the State or 'Territory in which 
they reside .... " 
The State relies on Goudy v. Meath, 203 U. S. 146 
(1906), where the Court, applying the above section, 
rejected the claim of an Indian patentee thereunder that 
state taxing jurisdiction was not among the "laws" to 
which he and his land had been made subject. Building 
on Goudy and the fact that the General Allotment Act 
has never been explicitly "repealed," the State claims 
that Congress has never intended to withdraw Montana's 
taxing jurisdiction, and that such power continues to the 
present. 
We find the argument untenable for several reasons. 
By its terms it does not reach Indians residing or pre-
clueing income from lands held in trust for the Tribe, 
which make up about one-half of the land area of the 
reservation. If the General Allotment Act itself estab-
lishes Montana's jurisdiction as to those Indians living· 
on "fee patented" lands, then for all jurisdictional pur-
poses-civil and criminal-the Flathead Reservation has 
been substantially diminished in size. A similar claim 
was made by the State in Seymour v. Superintendent,. 
· Zf68 U. S. 351 (1962), to which we responded : 
'"~[the 1 argument rests upon the fact that where the' 
··. 
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existence or nonexistence of an Indian reservation, 
and therefore the existence or nonexistence of fed-
rral jurisdiction, depends upon the ownership of 
particular parcels of land, law enforcement officers 
operating in the area will find it necessary to search 
tract books in order to determine whether criminal 
jurisdiction over each particular offense, even though 
committed within the reservation, is in the State or 
Federal Government." !d., at 358. 
We concluded that "[s]uch an impractical pattern of 
checkerboard jurisdiction," id., was contrary to the intent 
embodied in the existing federal statutory law of Indian 
jurisdiction. See also United States v. Mazurie, 419 
u.s. 544, 554-555 (1975). 
The State's argument also overlooks what this Court 
has recently said of the present effect of the General 
Allotment Act and related legislation of that era: 
"Its policy was to continue the reservation system 
and the trust status of Indian lands, but to allot 
tracts to individual Indians for agriculture and graz-
ing. When all the lands had been allotted and the 
trust expired, the reservation could be abolished. 
Unallotted lands were made available to non-Indians 
with the purpose, in part, of promoting interaction 
between the races and of encoura.ging the Indians 
to adopt white ways. See § 6 of the General Allot-
ment Act, 24 Stat. 390; [citation omitted]. The 
policy of allotment and sale of surplus reservation 
land was repudiated in 1934 by the Indian Reorgani-
zatiOn Act, 48 Stat. 984, now amended and codified 
as 25 U. S. C. § 461 et seq." Mattz v. Arnett, 412 
U S. 481, 496 (1973) (part of footnote 18 incorpo-
rated mto t,ext ). 
The State has 11eferred us to no decisional authority-
and wr know of none-giving the meaning for which it 
·'' 
'· 
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contends to § 6 of the General Allotment Act in the face 
of the many and complex intervening jurisdictional stat-
utes directed at the reach of state law within reservation 
lands-statutes discussed, for example, in McClanahan, 
411 U. S., at 173-179. See also Kennerly v. District 
Court of Montana, 400 U. S. 423 (1971). Congress by 
its more modern legislation has evinced a clear intent to 
eschew any such "checkerboard" approach within an 
existing Indian reservation, and our cases have in turn 
followed Congress' lead in this area. 
A second, discrete claim advanced by the State is that. 
the tax immunity extended by the District Court in 
applying federal law constitutes an invidious discrimina-
tion against non-Indians on the basis of race, contrary 
to the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. It 
is said that the Federal Government has forced this 
·racially-based exemption onto Montana so as to create· 
a state statutory classification violative of the latter's 
duty under the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-· 
teenth Amendment. 
We need not dwell at length on this constitutional 
argument, for assuming that the State has standing to• 
raise 1t on behalf of its non-Indian citizens and taxpayers, 
we think it is foreclosed by our recent decision in Morton 
·v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535 (1974) . In reviewing the· 
variety of statutes and decisions according special treat-
_ment to Indian tribes and reservations, we stated, 417 
U.S., at 552-555: 
"Literally every piece of legislation dealing with 
Indian tribes and reservations ... single [s] out for 
special treatment a constituency of tribal Indians 
living on or near reservations. If these laws, de-
tived from historical relationships and explicitly de~ 
Signed to help only Indians, were deemed invidious 
raCial discrimination, an entire Title of the United 
States Codf' (25 U. S. C.) would be effective]£· 
,-
- t 
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erased and the sol.emn commitment of the Govern-
ment toward the Indians would be jeopardized. 
"On numerous occasions this Court specifically has 
upheld legislation that singles out · Indians for par .. 
ticular and special treatment." 
The test to be applied to these kinds of statutory prefer .. 
ences, which we said were neither "invidious" nor "racial" 
in character, governs here: 
"As long as the special treatment can ·be tied -ra .. 
tionally to the fulfillment of Congress' unique obJi .. 
gation toward the Indians, such legislative judgments 
will not be disturbed." I d., at 555. 
For these reasons, the personal property tax on per .. 
sonal property located within the reservation; the vendor 
license fee sought to be applied to a reservation Indian 
conducting a cigarette business for the Tribe on reser-
vation land; and the cigarette sales tax, as applied to on-
. reservation sales by Indians to Indians/6 conflict with 
the congressional statutes which provide the basis for 
demsion with respect to such impositions. McClanahan, 
supra; Mescalero, supra.11 
16 The District Court noted two further distinctions within its 
ruling. It extended its holding to sales of cigarettes to Indians 
living on the Flathead Reservation irrespective of their actual mem-
bership in the plaintiff Tribe. The State has not challenged this· 
holding, and we therefore do not disturb it. Secondly, while recog-
nizing that different rules may apply "where Indians have left the 
reservation and become assimilated into the general community," 
McClanahan, 411 U. S., at 171, the District Court on the present 
record did not decide whether the cigarette sales tax would apply to 
· on-reservation sales to Indians who resided off the Flathead Reser-
vation. That question, too, is therefore not before us. 
17 It is thus clear that the basis for the mvalidity of these taxing 
measures, which we have found to be inconsistent with existing fed-
eral statutes, is the Supremacy Clause, U S Const ., Art .. VI , Cl. 2. 
- . ' .. 
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IV 
The Tribe would carry these cases significantly further 
than we have done, however, and urges that the State 
cannot impose its cigarette tax on sales by Indians to 
non-Indians because "[i]n simple terms, [the Indian re-
tailer] has been taxed, and ... has suffered a measurable 
out-of-pocket loss." But this claim ignores the District 
Court's finding that "it is the non-Indian consumer or 
user who saves the tax and reaps the benefit of the tax 
exemption." 392 F. Supp., at 1308. That finding neces-
sarily follows from the Montana statute, which provides 
that the cigarette tax "shall be conclusively presumed to 
be [a] direct [tax] on the retail consumer precollected for 
the purpose of convenience and facility only." 18 Since 
nonpayment of the tax is a misqemeanor as to the retail 
purchaser,111 the competitive advantage which the Indian 
seller doing business on tribal land enjoys over all other 
cigarette retailers, within and without the reservation, is 
dependent on the extent to which the non-Indian pur-
chaser is willing to flout his legal obligation to pay the 
tax. Without the simple expedient of having the re-
tailer collect the sales tax from non-Indian purchasers, it 
and not any automatic exemptions "as a matter of constitutional law" 
either under the Commerce Clause or the intergovernmental-immu-
nity doctrine as laid down originally in M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 
Wheat. 316 (1819) . If so, then the basis for convening a three-
judge cotlrt ln this type of case has effectively disappeared, for this 
Court has expressly held that attacks on state statutes raising only 
Supremacy Clause invalidity do not fall within the scope of 2S 
U. S. C. § 2281. Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U. S. 111 (1965) . 
Here, however, the District Court properly convened a § 2281 court, 
because at the outset the Tribe's attack asserted unconstitutionality 
of these statutes under the Commerce Clause, a not-insubstantial 
claim since Mescalero and McClanahan had not yet been decided. 
See Goosby v. Osser, 409 U. S. 512 (1973) . 
~s Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 84-5606 (1) (1947), 
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is clear that wholesale violations of the law by the latter 
class will go virtually unchecked. 
The Tribe asserts that to make the Indian retailer an 
"involuntary agent" for collection of taxes owed by non~ 
Indians is a "gross interference with [its] freedom from 
state regulation,)' and cites Warren Trading Post v. 
Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U. S. 685 (1965), as control-
ling. However, that case involved a gross income tax 
imposed on the on-reservation sales by the trader to resw 
. ervation Indians. Unlike the sales tax here, the tax was 
imposed directly on the seller, and, in contrast to the 
Tribe's claim, there was in Warren no claim that the 
State could not tax that portion of the receipts attributa~ 
ble to on-reservation sales to non-Indians. !d., 380 U.S., 
at 686 n. 1. Our conclusion in Warren that assessment 
and collection of that tax ~'would to a substantial extent 
frustrate the evident congressional purpose of ensuring 
that no burden shall be imposed upon Indian traders for 
trading with Indians on reservations," id., at 691, does 
not apply to the instant case. 
The State's requirement that the Indian tribal seller 
collect a tax validly imposed on non-Indians is a miniiiJ.al 
burden designed to avoid the likelihood that l.n its ab-
sence non-Indians purchasing from the tribal seller will 
avoid payment of a concededly lawful tax. Since this 
burden is not, strictly speaking, !1- tax at all, it is not 
governed by the language of Mescalero, quoted supra, 
·dealing with the "special area of state taxation." We 
see nothing in this burden which frustrates tribal self-
government, see Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217, 219-220 
(1959), or runs afoul of any congressional enactment 
dealing with the affairs of reservation Indians, United 
States v. McGowan, 302 U. S. 535, 539 (1938): "Ena!)t-
ments of the Federal Government passed to protect and 
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the colony, of such state laws as conflict with the federal 
enactments." See alsq Thomas v. Gay, 169 U. S. 264, 
273 (1898) . We therefore agree with the District 
Court that to the extent that the "smoke shops" sell to 
those upon whom the State has validly imposed a sales 
or excise tax with respect to the article sold, the State 
may require the Indian proprietor simply to add the tax 
to the sales price and thereby aid the State's collection 
and enforcement thereof. 
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